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Abstract 
This paper tests the hypothesis that government bond markets in the eurozone are more 
fragile  and  more  susceptible  to  self-fulfilling  liquidity  crises  than  those  in  ‘stand-alone’ 
countries,  i.e.  countries  that  issue  debt  in  their  own  currencies.  We  find  evidence  that  a 
significant part of the surge in the spreads of the PIGS countries (Portugal, Ireland, Greece 
and Spain) in the eurozone during 2010-11 was disconnected from underlying increases in 
the debt-to-GDP ratios and fiscal space variables, but rather was the result of negative self-
fulfilling market sentiments that became very strong starting at the end of 2010. We argue 
that this phenomenon can drive member countries of the eurozone into bad equilibria. 
We also find evidence that after years of neglecting high government debt, investors became 
increasingly worried about it in the eurozone, and reacted by raising the spreads. No such 
worries  developed  in  stand-alone  countries,  despite  the  fact  that  debt-to-GDP  ratios  and 
fiscal space variables were equally high and increasing in these countries.  
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Self-Fulfilling Crises in the Eurozone: 
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CEPS Working Document No. 366/June 2012 
Paul De Grauwe and Yuemei Ji 
Introduction 
The financial crisis that erupted in the industrialised world in 2007 forced governments to 
save  their  domestic  banking  systems  from  collapse  and  to  sustain  their  economies  that 
experienced their sharpest post-war recession. As a result, these governments saw their debt 
levels increase dramatically. Figure 1 shows this for the US, the UK and the eurozone.   
Figure 1 is also interesting for another reason. We observe that the increase in the debt-to-
GDP ratios since 2007 is significantly faster in the US and the UK than in the eurozone, so 
much so that at the end of 2011 the US surpassed the eurozone’s debt-to-GDP ratio and the 
UK is soon to do so. Yet it is the eurozone that has experienced a severe sovereign debt crisis 
and  not  the  US nor  the  UK.  The  severity  of  the  sovereign  debt  crisis  in  the  eurozone  is 
illustrated in Figure 2, which shows the spectacular increase in the spreads of a large number 
of eurozone countries.1 
Figure 1. Gross government debt in the eurozone, the US and the UK 
 
Source: European Commission, Ameco. 
                                                   
1 The spreads are defined as the differences of 10-year government bond rates of each country and that 
of German government bonds. 2 |  DE GRAUWE & JI 
 
Figure 2. Spreads in 10-year government bond rates 
 
Source: Datastream. 
In De Grauwe (2011a), a theory of the fragility of the eurozone is developed that explains 
why  the  eurozone  countries  are  more  prone  to  experience  a  sovereign  debt  crisis  than 
countries that are not part of a monetary union, even when these countries experience a 
worse fiscal situation. The purpose of this paper is to provide a further empirical test of this 
theory.  
Section 1 summarises the main features of the fragility theory of the eurozone and derives 
the testable implications. Section 2 presents some preliminary data and section 3 describes 
the econometric testing procedure and discusses the results. Section 4 derives some policy 
implications. 
1.  The fragility of the eurozone 
The  key  to  understanding  the  sovereign  debt  crisis  in  the  eurozone  has  to  do  with  an 
essential  feature  of  a  monetary  union.2 Members  of  a  monetary  union  issue  debt  in  a 
currency over which they have no control. As a result, the governments of these countries 
cannot give a guarantee that the cash will always be available to pay out bondholders at 
maturity. It is literally possible that these governments find out that the liquidity is lacking to 
pay out bondholders.  
This  is not  the  case  in  ‘stand-alone’  countries,  i.e.  countries  that  issue  debt  in  their  own 
currency. These countries can give a guarantee to the bondholders that the cash will always 
be available to pay them out. The reason is that if the government were to experience a 
shortage of liquidity, it could call upon the central bank to provide the liquidity. And there is 
no limit to the capacity of a central bank to do so.  
The  absence  of  a  guarantee  that  the  cash  will  always  be  available  creates  fragility  in  a 
monetary union. Member countries are susceptible to movements of distrust. When investors 
                                                   
2 See De Grauwe (2011b) for a more detailed analysis. See also Kopf (2011). SELF-FULFILLING CRISES IN THE EUROZONE | 3 
 
fear some payment difficulty, e.g. triggered by a recession, they sell the government bonds. 
This has two effects. It raises the interest rate and leads to a liquidity outflow as the investors 
who have sold the government bonds look for safer places to invest. This ‘sudden stop’ can 
lead to a situation in which the government cannot roll over its debt except at prohibitive 
interest rates.  
The ensuing liquidity crisis can easily degenerate into a solvency crisis. As the interest rate 
shoots  up,  the  country  is  likely  to  be  pushed  into  a  recession.  This  tends  to  reduce 
government  revenues  and  to  increase  the  deficit  and  debt  levels.  The  combination  of 
increasing interest rates and debt levels can push the government into default.  
There is a self-fulfilling element in this dynamics. When investors fear default, they act in 
such  a  way  that  default  becomes  more  likely.  A  country  can  become  insolvent  because 
investors fear default. 
The problem of member countries of a monetary union described above is similar to the 
problems  faced  by  emerging  countries  that  issue  debt  in  a  foreign  currency,  usually  the 
dollar.  These  countries  can  be  confronted  with  a  ‘sudden  stop’  when  capital  inflows 
suddenly stop, leading to a liquidity crisis (see Calvo et al., 2006). This problem has been 
analysed  extensively  by  economists,  who  have  concluded  that  financial  markets  acquire 
great power in these countries and can force them into default (see Eichengreen et al., 2005). 
The liquidity crises in a monetary union also make it possible for the emergence of multiple 
equilibria.  Countries  that  are  distrusted  by  the market  are  forced  into  a  bad  equilibrium 
characterised  by  high  interest  rates  and  the  need  to  impose  strong  budgetary  austerity 
programmes that push these countries into a deep recession. Conversely, countries that are 
trusted become the recipients of liquidity inflows that lower the interest rate and boost the 
economy. They are pushed into a good equilibrium. In De Grauwe (2011a), a formal model 
inspired  by  the  Obstfeld  (1986)  model  of  foreign  currency  crises  is  presented  in  which 
multiple equilibria are a possible outcome.3 In the Appendix a simple version of this model is 
presented. 
Finally it should also be mentioned that the fragility of member countries of a monetary 
union has a similar structure as the fragility of banks. The latter are fragile because of the 
unbalanced  maturity  structure  of  their  assets  and  liabilities.  The  latter  have  shorter 
maturities  than  the  former  (‘banks  borrow  short  and  lend  long’).  As  a  result,  banks  are 
vulnerable to runs. When depositors fear liquidity problems, they run to the bank to convert 
their  deposits  into  cash,  thereby  precipitating  the  liquidity  crisis  that  they  fear.  (See  the 
classic model of bank runs in Diamond & Dybvig, 1983.) This problem can be solved by the 
central bank promising to step in and to provide liquidity in times of crisis (‘lender of last 
resort’).  
Governments in a monetary union that cannot rely on a lender of last resort face a similar 
fragility.  Their  liabilities  (bonds)  are  liquid  and  can  be  converted  into  cash  quickly. 
Government  assets  (physical  assets,  claims  on  taxpayers),  however,  are  illiquid.  In  the 
absence  of  a  central  bank  that  is  willing  to  provide  liquidity,  these  governments  can  be 
pushed into a liquidity crisis because they cannot transform their assets into liquid funds 
quickly enough.  
                                                   
3 There exist many formal theoretical models that create self-fulfilling liquidity crises. Many of these 
have been developed for explaining crises in the foreign exchange markets (see Obstfeld, 1986). Other 
models have been applied to the government debt (Calvo, 1988, Gros, 2012 and Corsetti & Dedola, 
2011). 4 |  DE GRAUWE & JI 
 
2.  How to test the theory? 
The theory presented in the previous section leads to a number of testable propositions.  
We have seen that in a monetary union movements of distrust vis-à-vis one country lead to 
an increase in the government bond rate of that country and thus to an increase in the spread 
(the difference) with the bond rates of other countries. When such movements of distrust 
occur,  these  spreads  are  likely  to  increase  significantly  without  much  movement  of  the 
underlying fundamentals that influence the solvency of the country. More precisely when 
market  sentiments  turn  against  a  country, the  spreads  are  likely  to  exhibit  the  following 
features:  
  Large movements in the spreads occur over short periods. 
  Changes  in  the  fundamental  variables  cannot  account  for  the  total  change  in  the 
spreads.4 Movements in the spreads appear to be dissociated from the fundamentals.  
  The changes in the spreads are clustered in time.  
Thus one way to test the theory is first to estimate a model that explains the spreads by a 
number of fundamental variables. In a second stage we track the estimated errors of the 
model,  i.e.  the  deviations  of  the  observed  spreads  from  the  spreads  as  estimated  by  the 
model.  More specifically we wish to identify periods during which market sentiments drive 
the  spreads  away  from  their  underlying  fundamentals.  In  a  third  stage  we  estimate  the 
model with time dummies that are independent from the fundamentals, and analyze how 
much of the total variation of the spreads can be accounted for by these time dummies.  
In order for such a test to be convincing, it will be important to analyze a control group of 
countries that do not belong to a monetary union. We will therefore take a sample of ‘stand-
alone’ countries and analyze whether in this control group one observes similar movements 
of  the  spreads  away  from  their  underlying  fundamentals.  Our  theory  predicts  that  this 
should not happen in countries that have full control over the currency in which they issue 
their debt. 
3.  The facts about spreads and debt-to-GDP ratios 
Before performing a rigorous econometric analysis explaining the spreads, it is useful to look 
at how the spreads and the debt-to-GDP ratios have evolved over time in the eurozone and 
in the sample of ‘stand-alone’ countries.  We look at the relation between the spreads and the 
debt-to-GDP ratio, as the latter is the most important fundamental variable influencing the 
spreads (as will become clear from our econometric analysis).  
We  first  present  the  relation  between  the  spreads  and  the  debt-to-GDP  ratios  in  the 
eurozone. This is done in Figure 3, which shows the spreads on the vertical axis and the 
debt-to-GDP ratios on the horizontal axis in the eurozone countries. Each point is a particular 
observation of one of the countries in a particular quarter (sample period 2000Q1-2011Q3). 
We also draw a straight line obtained from a simple regression of the spread as a function of 
the debt-to-GDP ratio.  
                                                   
4 Note  that  we  are  not  implying  that  fundamentals  do  not  matter;  in  fact  small  movements  of 
fundamentals can trigger large movements in spreads, because they trigger the fear factor (like in a 
bank run). SELF-FULFILLING CRISES IN THE EUROZONE | 5 
 
Figure 3. Spreads and debt-to-GDP ratio in eurozone (2000Q1-2011Q3) 
 
Sources: Eurostat and Datastream. 
 
We  observe  first  that  there  is  a  positive  relation  (represented  by  the  positively  sloped 
regression  line)  between  the  spread  and  the  debt-to-GDP  ratio,  i.e.  higher  spreads  are 
associated with higher debt-to-GDP ratios. We will return to this relationship and present 
more precise statistical results in the next section.  
A second observation to be made from Figure 3 is that the deviations from the fundamental 
line (the regression line) appear to occur in bursts that are time dependent. We show this in 
Figure 4, which is the same as Figure 3 but where we have highlighted all observations that 
are more than 3 standard deviations from the fundamental line in a triangle. 
Figure 4. Spreads and debt-to-GDP ratio in eurozone (2000Q1-2011Q3) 
 
Sources: Eurostat and Datastream. 
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It is striking to find that all these observations concern three countries (Greece, Portugal and 
Ireland) and that these observations are highly time dependent, i.e. the deviations start at 
one particular moment of time and then continue to increase in the next consecutive periods. 
Thus, the dramatic increases in the spreads that we observe in these countries from 2010 on 
do not appear to be much related to the increase in the debt-to-GDP ratios during the same 
period. This is as the theory predicts. We will analyze whether this result stands the scrutiny 
of econometric testing. 
Do the same developments occur in ‘stand-alone’ countries, i.e. countries that are not part of 
a  monetary  union  and  issue  debt  in  their  own  currencies?  We  selected  14  ‘stand-alone’ 
developed countries (Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, Japan, South 
Korea,  Norway,  Poland,  Singapore,  Sweden,  Switzerland,  the  US  and  the  UK) 5  and 
computed the spreads of the 10-year government bond rates. In order to make the analysis 
comparable  with  our  analysis  of  the  eurozone  countries,  we  selected  the  same  risk-free 
government bond, i.e. the German government bond. We could also have selected the US 
government bond. In fact doing so leads to very similar results.  
It  is  important  to  stress  that  the spreads  between  ‘stand-alone’  countries  reflect  not  only 
default risk but also exchange rate risk. It is even likely that the latter dominates the default 
risk, as exchange rates exhibit large fluctuations thereby creating large risks resulting from 
these  fluctuations.  In  the  econometric  analysis we  will  therefore  introduce  exchange  rate 
changes as an additional explanatory variable of the spreads. Before we do this, we present 
the  plots  of  the  spreads  and  the  debt-to-GDP  ratios  in  the  same  way  as  we  did  for  the 
eurozone countries in Figures 3 and 4. The result is shown in Figure 5.  
Figure 5. Spreads of ‘stand-alone’ countries (2000Q1-2011Q3) 
 
Sources: OECD and Datastream.  
Comparing Figure 5 with Figure 3 of the eurozone countries we find striking differences. A 
first difference with the eurozone countries is that the debt-to-GDP ratio seems to have a 
                                                   
5 Countries whose GDP per capita ≥ $20,000 and population ≥ 5 million are selected. Saudi Arabia and 
the United Arab Emirates are excluded because their economies are heavily dependent on oil exports. 
Hong Kong, Israel and Taiwan are excluded because of a lack of some relevant data. Slovakia is a 
special case as it joined the eurozone in 2009 and should not be included in the stand-alone sample.  
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very weak effect on the spreads. Second, and most importantly, we do not detect sudden and 
large  time-dependent  departures  of  the  spreads  from  their  fundamentals.  All  the 
observations,  although  volatile  in  the  short-run,  cluster  together  around  some  constant 
number between –4% and 8%.  
The contrast between the eurozone countries and the sample of stand-alone countries also 
appears in the occurrence of structural breaks. We split the sample between the pre- and the 
post-financial crisis period. We show the results in Figures 6 and 7.  
Figure 6. Spreads and debt-to-GDP ratios in eurozone  
Prior to 2008          Since 2008 
   
Sources: Eurostat and Datastream.  
 
Figure 7. Spreads and debt-to-GDP ratios of ‘stand-alone’ countries  
Prior to 2008          Since 2008 
   
Sources: OECD and Datastream. 
 
The  most  striking  difference  is  that  a  significant  break  in  the  relationship  between  the 
spreads and the debt-to-GDP ratio seems to have occurred in the eurozone. While before the 
crisis  the  debt-to-GDP  ratios  in  the  eurozone  do  not  seem  to  have  affected  the  spreads 
(despite  a  large  variation  in  these  ratios),  after  2008,  this  relationship  becomes  quite 
significant. This contrasts with the stand-alone countries where the financial crisis does not 8 |  DE GRAUWE & JI 
 
seem  to  have  changed  the  relationship  between  spreads  and  debt-to-GDP  ratios,  i.e.  it 
appears that since the financial crisis the link between spreads and debt-to-GDP ratios has 
remained equally weak for the stand-alone countries. Thus, financial markets are not eager 
to impose more discipline on the stand-alone countries since the start of the financial crisis, 
while they have become very eager to do so in the eurozone. This by itself also tends to 
confirm the fragility hypothesis formulated earlier, i.e. it appears that financial markets are 
less  tolerant  towards  high  debt-to-GDP  ratios  in  the  eurozone  than  in  the  stand-alone 
countries. We also note that after 2008 time-dependent departures of the spreads from the 
fundamental seem to occur. 
4.  Implementing the testing procedure 
In this section we implement the statistical testing procedure of the fragility hypothesis. We 
will proceed in two steps. We first specify and estimate a fundamentals’ based model of the 
spreads. In the second step we introduce a time variable that will allow us to track time 
dependent movements of the spreads that are unrelated to the fundamentals.  
In our specification of the fundamentals model we rely on the existing literature.6 The most 
common  fundamental  variables  found  in  this  literature  are:  variables  measuring  the 
sustainability of government debt. We will use two alternative concepts, i.e. the debt-to-GDP 
ratio and the ‘fiscal space’. In addition, we use the current account position, the real effective 
exchange  rate  and  the  rate  of  economic  growth  as  fundamental  variables  affecting  the 
spreads.  The  effects  of  these  fundamental  variables  on  the  spreads  can  be  described  as 
follows.  
  When  the  government  debt-to-GDP  ratio  increases,  the  burden  of  the  debt  service 
increases leading to an increasing probability of default. This then in turn leads to an 
increase in the spread, which is a risk premium investors demand to compensate them 
for the increased default risk.7  
  ‘Fiscal  space’  is  defined  as  the  ratio  of  the  government  debt  to  total  tax  revenues. 
Aizenman & Hutchinson, 2012 argue that this is a better measure of debt sustainability 
than the debt-to-GDP ratio. A country may have a low debt-to-GDP ratio, yet find it 
difficult to service its debt because of a low capacity of raising taxes. In this case the 
ratio of government debt to tax revenues will be high, i.e. it takes a lot of years to 
generate the tax revenues necessary to service the debt.  
  The current account has a similar effect on the spreads. Current account deficits should 
be interpreted as increases in the net foreign debt of the country as a whole (private 
and official residents). This is also likely to increase the default risk of the government 
for  the  following  reason.  If the  increase  in  net foreign  debt  arises  from  the  private 
sector’s overspending it will lead to default risk of the private sector. However, the 
government is likely to be affected because such defaults lead to a negative effect on 
economic  activity,  inducing  a  decline  in  government  revenues  and  an  increase  in 
                                                   
6 Attinasi et al. (2009), Arghyrou & Kontonikas (2010), Gerlach et al. (2010), Schuknecht et al. (2010), 
Caceres et al. (2010), Caporale & Girardi (2011), Gibson et al. (2011), Aizenman & Hutchinson (2012) 
and Beirne & Fratzscher (2012). There is of course a vast literature on the spreads in the government 
bond markets in general. See for example the classic Eaton et al. (1986) and Eichengreen & Mody 
(2000). Much of this literature has been influenced by the debt problems of emerging economies. See 
for example, Edwards (1984 and 1986) and Min (1998). 
7 We also experimented with the government deficit to GDP ratio. But this variable does not have a 
significant effect in any of the regressions we estimated.   SELF-FULFILLING CRISES IN THE EUROZONE | 9 
 
government  budget  deficits.  If  the  increase  in  net  foreign  indebtedness  arises  from 
government  overspending,  it  directly  increases  the  government’s  debt  service,  and 
thus the default risk.  
  The real effective exchange rate as a measure of competitiveness can be considered as an 
early warning variable indicating that a country that experiences a real appreciation 
will run into problems of competitiveness, which in turn will lead to future current 
account deficits, and future debt problems. Investors may then demand an additional 
risk premium.  
  Economic growth affects the ease with which a government is capable of servicing its 
debt. The lower the growth rate the more difficult it is to raise tax revenues. As a result 
a decline of economic growth will increase the incentive of the government to default, 
raising the default risk and the spread. 
We specify the econometric equation both in a linear and a non-linear form. The reason why 
we  also  specify  a  non-linear  relationship  between  the  spread  and  the  debt-to-GDP  ratio 
comes from the fact that every decision to default is a discontinuous one, and leads to high 
potential losses. Thus, as the debt-to-GDP ratio increases, investors realize that they come 
closer to the default decision, making them more sensitive to a given increase in the debt-to-
GDP ratio (Giavazzi & Pagano, 1996). 
The linear equation is specified as follows: 
    =   +   ∗      +   ∗        + μ ∗       +   ∗      ℎ   +    +     
where Iit is the interest rate spread of country i in period t,     is the current account surplus 
of country i in period t, and       is either the government debt-to-GDP ratio or the fiscal 
space  of  country  i  in  period  t,       is  the  real  effective  exchange  rate,      ℎ   is  GDP 
growth  rate,   is  the  constant  term  and    is  country  i’s  fixed  effect.  The  latter  variable 
measures  the  idiosyncrasies  of  a  country  that  affect  its  spread  and  that  are  not  time 
dependent. For example, the efficiency of the tax system, the quality of the governance, and 
many other variables that are country-specific are captured by the fixed effect.  
The non-linear specification is as follows: 
    =   +   ∗      +    ∗        + μ ∗       +   ∗      ℎ   +    ∗ (      )  +    +     
A methodological note should be made here. In the existing empirical literature there has 
been a tendency to add a lot of other variables on the right hand side of the two equations. In 
particular, researchers have added risk measures and ratings by rating agencies as additional 
explanatory variables of the spreads. The problem with this is that risk variables and ratings 
are unlikely to be exogenous. When a sovereign debt crisis erupts in the eurozone, all these 
risk variables increase, including the so-called ‘systemic risk’ variables. Similarly, as rating 
agencies tend to react to movements in spreads, the latter also are affected by increases in the 
spreads. Including these variables in the regression is likely to improve the fit dramatically 
without, however, adding to the explanation of the spreads. In fact, the addition of these 
variables creates a risk of false claims that the fundamental model explains the spreads well.   
After having established by a Hausmann test that the random effect model is inappropriate, 
we used a fixed effect model. A fixed effect model helps to control for unobserved time-
invariant  variables  and  produces  unbiased  estimates  of  the  ‘fundamental’  variables.  The 
results of estimating the linear and non-linear models are shown in Tables 1 (eurozone) and 2 
(‘stand-alone’ countries). These results lead to the following interpretations.  
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Table 1. Government bond spread in eurozone (2000Q1-2011Q3) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Current account GDP ratio  0.0243  0.0409  0.0191  0.0356 
  [0.0417]  [0.0425]  [0.0442]  [0.0414] 
Real effective exchange rate  0.0278  0.0181  0.0206  0.0047 
  [0.0179]  [0.0201]  [0.0179]  [0.0136] 
Growth rate  -0.0698  -0.0526***  -0.0604  -0.0427*** 
  [0.0496]  [0.0103]  [0.0411]  [0.0053] 
Debt-to-GDP ratio  0.0818***  -0.0553*     
  [0.0148]  [0.0300]     
Debt-to-GDP ratio squared    0.0009***     
    [0.0002]     
Fiscal space      2.7284***  -1.8316*** 
      [0.4589]  [0.2557] 
Fiscal space squared        0.9270*** 
        [0.0634] 
Country fixed effect  controlled  controlled  controlled  controlled 
Observations  470  470  470  470 
R2  0.6601  0.7989  0.6960  0.8549 
Cluster at country level and robust standard error is shown in brackets. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Table 2. Government bond spread in ‘stand-alone’ countries (2000Q1-2011Q3) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Current account GDP ratio  0.0184  0.0200  0.0161  0.0137 
  [0.0166]  [0.0182]  [0.0183]  [0.0211] 
Real effective exchange rate  0.0019  0.0030  0.0013  0.0006 
  [0.0082]  [0.0074]  [0.0081]  [0.0081] 
Change in exchange rate   -0.0273**  -0.0234**  -0.0274**  -0.0264** 
  [0.0098]  [0.0098]  [0.0097]  [0.0095] 
Growth rate  -0.0229  -0.0253  -0.0249  -0.0282 
  [0.0284]  [0.0286]  [0.0290]  [0.0304] 
Debt-to-GDP ratio  0.0102  -0.0164     
  [0.0077]  [0.0124]     
Debt-to-GDP ratio squared    0.0001***     
    [0.0000]     
Fiscal space      0.2258  -0.2155 
      [0.2014]  [0.4528] 
Fiscal space squared        0.0474 
        [0.0444] 
Country fixed effect  controlled  controlled  controlled  controlled 
Observations  658  658  658  658 
R2  0.8423  0.8504  0.8409  0.8439 
Cluster at country level and robust standard error is shown in brackets. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
First,  the  debt-to-GDP  ratio  and  the  fiscal  space  variables  have  significant  effects  on  the 
spreads  in  the  eurozone.  The  fiscal  space  variable  appears  to  have  a  slightly  higher 
explanatory power as can be seen from the fact that the R2 is higher when we use the fiscal 
space variable instead of the debt-to-GDP ratio. In contrast, the debt-to-GDP ratio and the 
fiscal  space  variables  have  little  impact  on  the  spreads  in  the  stand-alone  countries  (the 
coefficients are much lower and insignificant).  
Second,  the  non-linear  specification  both  for  the  debt-to-GDP  ratio  and  the  fiscal  space 
variables improve the fit in the eurozone countries. This can be seen from the fact that the R-
square in Table 1 increases in the non-linear specification. In addition, the squared debt-to-
GDP ratio and the fiscal space variables are very significant. Thus, an increasing debt-to-SELF-FULFILLING CRISES IN THE EUROZONE | 11 
 
GDP ratio and fiscal space have a non-linear effect on the spreads in the eurozone, i.e. a 
given increase of these ratios have a significantly higher impact on the spread when these 
ratios are high. The contrast with the stand-alone countries is strong. In these countries no 
such non-linear effects exist. Financial markets do not seem to be concerned with the size of 
the government debt and of the fiscal space and their impacts on the spreads of stand-alone 
countries, despite the fact that the variation of these ratios is of a similar order of magnitude 
as the one observed in the eurozone. This result tends to confirm the fragility hypothesis of 
the eurozone, i.e. financial markets are less tolerant towards high debt-to-GDP ratios and 
fiscal space in the eurozone countries than in the stand-alone countries.  
As the theory predicts, the GDP growth rate has a negative impact on the spreads in the 
eurozone. In the ‘stand-alone’ countries no significant growth effect is detected. The other 
fundamental variables (current account GDP ratio and real effective exchange rate) do not 
seem to have significant effects on the spreads, both in the eurozone and in the ‘stand-alone’ 
countries. The change of exchange rate seems to have a significant impact on the spread but 
the  sign  is  not  expected.  The  negative  sign  suggests  that  the  ‘carry  trade’  has  been  a 
significant factor, i.e. countries have low (high) interest rates tend to experience currency 
depreciations (appreciations). 
The graphical analysis of the previous section suggests that a structural break occurs at the 
time  of  the  financial  crisis.  A  Chow  test  revealed  that  a  structural  break  occurred  in  the 
eurozone and the ‘stand-alone’ countries around the year 2008. This allows us to treat the 
pre- and post-crisis periods as separate and we show the results in Table 3.  
In  general,  the  results  confirm  that  since  2008  the  markets  have  become  more  cautious 
towards some key economic fundamentals that are associated with higher spreads. To be 
specific, in both the eurozone and ‘stand-alone’ countries, the coefficients of the debt-to-GDP 
ratio and the fiscal space variable are low and insignificant prior to the crisis. In the post-
crisis period these coefficients become larger and are statistically significant.8 Moreover, the 
coefficient of the real effective exchange rate is negative prior to the crisis and this negative 
effect does not last any more.  
However,  the  contrast  in  the  post-crisis  period  between  the  eurozone  and  ‘stand-alone’ 
countries are striking. The coefficients of the debt-to-GDP ratio and the fiscal space in the 
eurozone are much larger than in the ‘stand-alone’ countries. Similarly, the coefficient of the 
real effective exchange rate in the eurozone is significant, while no significant relationship 
exists in the ‘stand-alone’ countries.  
The contrast between the eurozone and ‘stand-alone’ countries is also made clear by a pooled 
regression of the eurozone and the ‘stand-alone’ countries. We do this in Table 4. We have 
added three interaction variables “Debt-to-GDP*eurozone”, “Debt-to-GDP*Fiscal Space” and 
“Real effective exchange rate* eurozone”. The “Debt-to-GDP*eurozone” and the “Debt-to-
GDP*Fiscal Space” measure the degree to which these measures of debt sustainability affect 
the  eurozone  spreads  differently  from  the  ‘stand-alone’  countries.  The  “Real  effective 
exchange  rate*  eurozone”  measures  the  degree  to  which  the  real  effective  exchange  rate 
affects the eurozone spreads differently from the ‘stand-alone’ countries. The results of Table 
4  confirm  the  previous  results.  The  debt  sustainability  measures  and  the  real  effective 
exchange rate are much stronger and significant variables in the eurozone than in the ‘stand-
alone’ countries, especially in the post-crisis period. The ‘stand-alone’ countries seem to be 
able to “get away with murder” and still not be disciplined by financial markets.  
                                                   
8 Similar results are obtained by Schuknecht et al. (2010), Arghyrou & Kontonikas (2010), Borgy et al. 
(2011), Gibson et al. (2011), Beirne & Fratzscher (2012) and Ghosh & Ostry (2012). 12 |  DE GRAUWE & JI 
 
Table 3. Government bond spread (structural break) in eurozone and “stand-alone’ countries 
  Eurozone  ‘Stand-alone’ countries 
  Pre-
crisis 
Post-crisis  Pre-crisis  Post-crisis  Pre-crisis  Post-crisis  Pre-crisis  Post-crisis 
Current 
account 
GDP ratio 
-0.0057  0.0521  -0.0058  0.0203  -0.0272  0.0078  -0.0299  0.0108 
  [0.0056
] 
[0.0592]  [0.0054]  [0.0524]  [0.0230]  [0.0130]  [0.0243]  [0.0137] 
Real 
effective 
exchange 
rate 
-
0.0144*
** 
0.2912**  -
0.0144**
* 
0.2961**  -0.0208*  0.0024  -0.0195*  0.0018 
  [0.0035
] 
[0.1111]  [0.0034]  [0.1044]  [0.0101]  [0.0112]  [0.0103]  [0.0116] 
Growth 
rate 
-0.0007  0.0003  -0.0013  0.0087  -0.0098  -0.0133  -0.0104  -0.0116 
  [0.0032
] 
[0.0236]  [0.0034]  [0.0195]  [0.0582]  [0.0193]  [0.0568]  [0.0203] 
Debt-to-
GDP ratio 
0.0032  0.1485**
* 
    -0.0015  0.0246**
* 
   
  [0.0019
] 
[0.0293]      [0.0139]  [0.0073]     
Fiscal 
space 
    0.1412  4.8318**
* 
    0.0657  0.6736**
* 
      [0.0831]  [0.8438]      [0.3292]  [0.1973] 
Change  in 
exchange 
rate  
        -
0.0555**
* 
-0.0008  -
0.0558**
* 
-0.0011 
          [0.0127]  [0.0079]  [0.0128]  [0.0077] 
Country 
fixed effect 
controlle
d 
controlled  controlled  controlled  controlled  controlled  controlled  controlled 
Observations  320  150  320  150  448  210  448  210 
R
2  0.6820  0.7929  0.6888  0.8128  0.8356  0.9493  0.8357  0.9486 
Cluster at country level and robust standard error is shown in brackets. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 4. Government bond spread in ‘stand-alone’ countries and eurozone (%) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
  Total 
sample 
Pre-crisis  Post-crisis  Total 
sample 
Pre-crisis  Post-crisis 
Current account GDP ratio  0.0204  -0.0198  0.0167  0.0172  -0.0211  0.0122 
  [0.0175]  [0.0129]  [0.0164]  [0.0188]  [0.0131]  [0.0150] 
Debt-to-GDP ratio  0.0095  -0.0016  0.0240***       
  [0.0076]  [0.0136]  [0.0070]       
Debt-to-GDP ratio*eurozone  0.0748***  0.0052  0.1274***       
  [0.0195]  [0.0137]  [0.0325]       
Real effective exchange rate  0.0014  -0.0205*  0.0014  0.0009  -0.0195*  0.0010 
  [0.0080]  [0.0100]  [0.0112]  [0.0079]  [0.0101]  [0.0116] 
Real effective exchange 
rate*eurozone 
0.0343  0.0041  0.2818**  0.0256  0.0029  0.2810** 
  [0.0219]  [0.0104]  [0.1112]  [0.0210]  [0.0108]  [0.1060] 
Growth rate  -0.0384  -0.0086  -0.0103  -0.0365  -0.0091  -0.0065 
  [0.0253]  [0.0390]  [0.0148]  [0.0238]  [0.0376]  [0.0152] 
Change in exchange rate   -0.0296***  -
0.0554*** 
-0.0008  -0.0291***  -
0.0557*** 
-0.0006 
  [0.0105]  [0.0111]  [0.0082]  [0.0103]  [0.0112]  [0.0079] 
Fiscal space        0.2152  0.0455  0.6615*** 
        [0.1992]  [0.3236]  [0.1827] 
Fiscal space*eurozone        2.5743***  0.1127  4.1517*** 
        [0.5977]  [0.3298]  [0.9305] 
Country fixed effect  controlled  controlled  controlled  controlled  controlled  controlled 
Observations  1128  768  360  1128  768  360 
R
2  0.7785  0.8376  0.8652  0.7904  0.8377  0.8761 
Cluster at country level and robust standard error is shown in brackets. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
To  summarize,  we  find  a  great  contrast  between  the  eurozone  and  the  ‘stand-alone’ 
countries.  In  the  former,  we  detected  a  significant  increase  in  the  effect  of  the  debt 
sustainability measures and the real effective exchange rate on the spreads since 2008. Such 
an increase is completely absent in the ‘stand-alone’ countries. Second, there appears to be 
significant  departures  of  the  spreads  from  their  fundamental  values  in  the  eurozone 
countries after the start of the crisis, suggesting that time dependent movements in market 
sentiments  become  important.  This  does  not  seem  to  be  observed  in  the  ‘stand-alone’ 
countries. We analyze these time-dependent departures in the next section. 
5.  Introducing time dependency 
As will be remembered, an important element of the fragility hypothesis and of its capacity 
to generate self-fulfilling crises is that it can lead to movements in the spreads that appear to 
be unrelated to the fundamental variables of the model. We want to test this hypothesis by 
measuring the importance of time-dependent effects on the spreads that are unrelated to the 
fundamentals.  In  order  to  do so,  we  introduce time  dependency  in  the  basic  fixed-effect 
model. In the non-linear specification this yields:  
    =   +   ∗      +    ∗        + μ ∗       +   ∗      ℎ   +    ∗ (      )  
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where    is the time dummy variable. This measures the time effects that are unrelated to the 
fundamentals of the model or (by definition) to the fixed effects. If significant, it shows that 
the spreads move in time unrelated to the fundamentals forces driving the yields.  
We estimated this model for both the stand-alone and the eurozone countries. In addition, 
we estimated the model separately for two subgroups of the eurozone, i.e. the core and the 
periphery.9 The results are shown in Table 5.  
Table 5. Government bond spread regression with time component (%) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
  Stand-
alone 
Eurozone  Core  Periphery  Stand-
alone 
Eurozone  Core  Periphery 
Current 
account/GDP 
ratio 
0.0190  0.0628  -0.0099  0.0381  0.0149  0.0544  -0.0093  0.0551 
  [0.0216]  [0.0380]  [0.0133]  [0.0541]  [0.0208]  [0.0343]  [0.0111]  [0.0539] 
Real effective 
exchange rate 
0.0065  0.0140  0.0647**  0.0040  0.0066  0.0090  0.0557**  0.0014 
  [0.0077]  [0.0226]  [0.0234]  [0.0353]  [0.0075]  [0.0121]  [0.0171]  [0.0264] 
Growth rate  -0.0245  -
0.1311*** 
0.0032  -
0.0958** 
-0.0308  -0.0788**  0.0012  -0.0885** 
  [0.0425]  [0.0324]  [0.0144]  [0.0247]  [0.0408]  [0.0275]  [0.0157]  [0.0247] 
Change in 
exchange rate 
-0.0145        -0.0135       
  [0.0093]        [0.0094]       
Debt/GDP ratio  0.0115  -0.0538*  -0.0610*  -0.0619*         
  [0.0087]  [0.0242]  [0.0256]  [0.0234]         
                 
Debt/GDP ratio 
squared 
  0.0008***  0.0004*  0.0008**         
    [0.0002]  [0.0002]  [0.0001]         
Fiscal space          0.3074  -
2.1116*** 
-3.0513*  -2.0340** 
          [0.2261]  [0.3851]  [1.1941]  [0.5729] 
Fiscal space 
squared 
          0.8667***  0.8207**  0.7331*** 
            [0.0699]  [0.3186]  [0.1226] 
2010Q2  -0.1454  0.0326  0.1081  0.4846  -0.1690  0.2263  0.1847*  0.6809 
  [0.2881]  [0.3726]  [0.0880]  [0.6592]  [0.3156]  [0.2407]  [0.0872]  [0.5280] 
2010Q3  -0.1042  0.3226  0.1343  1.2979  -0.1348  0.4971  0.2054  1.5075 
  [0.2598]  [0.4801]  [0.1057]  [1.0810]  [0.2901]  [0.4057]  [0.1235]  [1.0300] 
2010Q4  -0.1275  0.5379  0.1856  1.7012**  -0.1582  0.6920*  0.2665  1.9527*** 
  [0.3048]  [0.5322]  [0.1337]  [0.3813]  [0.3322]  [0.3332]  [0.1531]  [0.3231] 
2011Q1  -0.4190  0.4821  0.1714  1.5040**  -0.4517  0.5814*  0.2571  1.7363*** 
  [0.3019]  [0.5273]  [0.1478]  [0.2808]  [0.3284]  [0.3140]  [0.1699]  [0.2098] 
2011Q2  -0.5446  1.0023  0.1524  3.0390**  -0.5906  1.1379*  0.2468  3.3287** 
  [0.3360]  [0.7615]  [0.1307]  [0.9228]  [0.3599]  [0.5739]  [0.1496]  [1.0161] 
2011Q3  -0.2805  1.4995*  0.7036*  3.5781*  -0.3174  1.6226**  0.7946  3.8471* 
  [0.2722]  [0.7627]  [0.3462]  [1.2372]  [0.3073]  [0.6665]  [0.3944]  [1.4454] 
Other quarterly 
dummies 
controlled  controlled  controlled  controlled  controlled  controlled  controlled  controlled 
                                                   
9 Chow test shows a split between the new and early members. Core eurozone = Austria, Belgium, 
France, Finland, Italy, Netherlands. Periphery: Ireland, Greece, Portugal and Spain. SELF-FULFILLING CRISES IN THE EUROZONE | 15 
 
Country fixed 
effect 
controlled  controlled  controlled  controlled  controlled  controlled  controlled  controlled 
Observations  658  470  282  188  658  470  282  188 
R
2  0.8602  0.8581  0.8287  0.9566  0.8600  0.9066  0.8288  0.9575 
 Cluster at country level and robust standard error is shown in brackets. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
The contrast between ‘stand-alone’ and eurozone countries is striking. The effect of the time 
variable in the stand-alone countries is weak. In the eurozone we detect some increasing 
positive time effect since 2010Q2. Noticeably there exist significant and positive time effects 
from 2010Q4 to 2011Q3 in the periphery of the eurozone. Thus, during the post-crisis period, 
the spreads in the peripheral countries of the eurozone were gripped by surges that were 
independent from the underlying fundamentals.  
Finally we plot the time effects obtained from Table 5 in Figure 8a and 8b. This suggests, 
especially in the periphery, that ‘departures’ occurred in the spreads, i.e. an increase in the 
spreads that cannot be accounted for by fundamental developments, in particular by the 
changes in the debt-to-GDP ratios and fiscal space during the crisis.  
This result can also be interpreted as follows. Before the crisis, the markets did not see any 
risk in the peripheral countries’ sovereign debt. As a result they priced the risks in the same 
way as the risk of core countries’ sovereign debt. After the crisis, spreads of the peripheral 
countries  increased  dramatically  and  independently  from  observed  fundamentals.  This 
suggests that the markets were gripped by negative sentiments and tended to exaggerate the 
default risks. Thus, mispricing of risks (in both directions) seems to have been an endemic 
feature in the eurozone. 
Figure 8a. Time component (debt/GDP ratio regression) 
                          Stand-alone                     Eurozone 
   
     Core Eurozone       Peripheral Eurozone 
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Figure 8b. Time component (fiscal space regression) 
                             Stand-alone           Eurozone 
     
                 Core Eurozone          Peripheral Eurozone  
   
6.  Tests for cross-sectional independence 
The previous results suggest that a common factor, i.e. market sentiments, influences the 
spreads in the eurozone. Such a common factor does not seem to influence the spreads in the 
‘stand-alone’ countries. The existence of a common factor in the eurozone spreads will create 
cross-country dependence in the error terms when we estimate the eurozone model without 
the  common  time  variables.  This  cross-sectional  dependence  should  disappear  when  we 
estimate the model with the time variables. We tested this by applying Pesaran’s test for 
cross-sectional independence. For   ≠  , the null hypothesis is   :   	    ,     = 0. 
The results are presented in Table 6. We observe that without the time variables the null 
hypothesis  of  cross-sectional  independence  should  be  rejected,  while  we  maintain  the 
hypothesis of independence when time variables are included. Thus when we estimate the 
model  without  time  variables  there  is  a  common  time  factor  in  the  error  terms  that 
disappears when we estimate the model with time variables. Table 6 also confirms that in the 
sample of stand-alone countries the error terms are not cross-sectionally correlated.  
Finally we also performed unit root cointegration tests. These are presented in Appendix B. 
We  find  that  the  debt  sustainability  variables  in  both  the  eurozone  and  ‘stand-alone’ 
countries  have  a  unit  root.  In  addition,  the  variables  of  the  eurozone  model  with  time 
variables are cointegrated. The variables in the ‘stand-alone’ countries without time variables 
are cointegrated. 
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Table 6. Pesaran's test of cross sectional independence  
   Debt to GDP ratio regression  Fiscal space regression 
Eurozone  
(without time 
variables) 
Reject cross sectional independence 
(p-value=0.0000) 
Reject cross sectional independence 
(p-value=0.0000) 
Eurozone  
(with time variables) 
Cannot reject cross sectional 
independence 
(p-value=1.996)* 
Cannot reject cross sectional 
independence 
(p-value=1.9917) 
Stand-alone  
(without time 
variable) 
Cannot reject cross sectional 
independence 
(p-value=1.483) 
Cannot reject cross sectional 
independence 
(p-value=0.4497) 
Note: *p-value>1 is possible because of the two-sided p-values for non-symmetric distributions. 
7.  Explanatory power analysis 
In this section we analyze the quantitative importance of the fundamental variables relative 
to the time dummies in explaining the changes in the spreads that have occurred since the 
start of the debt crisis. We proceed in two stages. We first compute the estimated spreads 
obtained from the models with and without the time dummies, and compare these with the 
observed spreads. In a second stage we perform a variance decomposition that allows us to 
measure the relative importance of the fundamentals and the time dummies in explaining 
the total variation in the spreads since 2008.  
Figure 9 shows the simulated spreads obtained from the models with and without dummies 
together with the observed spreads for Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain. We observe that 
the  model  without  the  time  dummies  fails  to  track  the  large  increases  in  the  spreads 
observed since 2008. In contrast the model with time dummies closely tracks these observed 
surges in the spreads. This confirms our previous results, i.e. a large part of the increases in 
the  spreads  in  the  peripheral  countries  is  the  result  of  time  dependent  movements  in 
sentiments that were independent from the underlying fundamentals. 
This conclusion is confirmed by the variance decomposition of the total observed variation 
from 2008 to 2011. This decomposition is shown in Figure 10. The results lead to additional 
insights. We observe that in Portugal and Ireland about half of the total variation of the 
spreads is due to the time dummies and the other half to the fundamentals. In the case of 
Spain most of the surge in the spreads is due to the time dummies. Thus in the case of Spain 
the fundamentals had little to do with the increasing spread and most of the explanation 
comes from the changes in market sentiments vis-à-vis Spain. The opposite holds for Greece. 
In this country the surge in the spreads is mostly explained by deteriorating fundamentals 
(about 70%) while the time dummies explain less than 30%. The contrast between Spain and 
Greece is interesting. In the case of Spain it is mostly distrust that moved the spreads, while 
in the case of Greece it is mostly bad fundamentals. This suggests that financial markets were 
pricing  the  risk  of  Greek  bonds  correctly,  but  may  have  mispriced  the  risk  of  Spanish 
government bonds. Note that we observe a similar phenomenon in the cases of Italy and 
Belgium where the largest part in the surge of the spreads is explained by the time dummies. 
This creates the risk that markets may be pushing Spain (and Italy and Belgium) into a bad 
equilibrium, which could be avoided by policies aimed at taking the fear factor out of the 
market.  Elsewhere  we  have  argued  that  this  could  be  done  by  lender-of-last-resort 
operations of the ECB (De Grauwe, 2011).  18 |  DE GRAUWE & JI 
 
     
   
 
 
Figure 9. Simulated (with and without times dummies) and observed spreads in peripheral countries SELF-FULFILLING CRISES IN THE EUROZONE | 19 
 
Figure 10. Variance decomposition of spreads 
 
 
The contrast between the eurozone countries and the ‘stand-alone’ countries is made clear in 
Figure 11. As noted earlier, in the case of the ‘stand-alone’ countries, there is no significant 
increase in the spreads since the start of the financial crisis. As a result, there is very little to 
explain.  This  is  remarkable  because  the  variation  in  the  two  variables  that  measure  debt 
sustainability in these countries (debt-to-GDP ratios and fiscal space) are at least as large as 
in the case of the eurozone countries. This is shown very vividly in Figure 11. Thus financial 
markets take the view that the build-up of the government debt measures does not lead to a 
default  risk  in  ‘stand-alone’  countries.  Financial  markets  do  not  punish  ‘stand-alone’ 
countries for public debt accumulation that appears to be equally unsustainable as in the 
eurozone countries. This result also confirms our hypothesis that a monetary union is fragile 
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and can easily be hit by negative market sentiments, which can drive countries into default 
in a self-fulfilling manner.  
Figure 11. Fiscal space index (pre-crisis and post-crisis) 
   
Debt-to GDP-ratio (pre-crisis and post-crisis) 
   
8.  Conclusion 
An important empirical puzzle concerning the sovereign debt crisis is that it erupted in the 
eurozone despite the fact that the fiscal position of the eurozone as a whole was better than 
the fiscal position of countries like the US and the UK that were left unscathed by the crisis. 
True Greece had accumulated unsustainable debt and deficit levels, but the other eurozone 
countries that were hit by the debt crisis were not in a worse fiscal position than the US and 
the UK.  
Our explanation of this puzzle is along the lines developed in De Grauwe (2011), who argues 
that government bond markets in a monetary union are more fragile and more susceptible to 
self-fulfilling liquidity crises than in ‘stand-alone’ countries. The reason is that as the latter 
issue their own money, they give a guarantee to bondholders that the cash will always be 
available at maturity. The members of a monetary union cannot give such a guarantee and as 
a result are more vulnerable to negative market sentiments which can create a liquidity crisis 
in  a  self-fulfilling  way.  The  purpose  of  this  paper  was  to  develop  a  test  of  this  fragility 
hypothesis.  SELF-FULFILLING CRISES IN THE EUROZONE | 21 
 
On the whole we confirm this hypothesis. We found evidence that a large part of the surge in 
the  spreads  of  the  PIGS  countries  during  2010-11  was  disconnected  from  underlying 
increases in the debt-to-GDP ratios and fiscal space, and was the result of time dependent 
negative market sentiments that became very strong since the end of 2010. The stand-alone 
countries in our sample have been immune from these liquidity crises and weathered the 
storm without the increases in the spread.  
We  also  found  evidence  that  after years  of  neglecting  high  debt-to-GDP  ratios,  investors 
became increasingly worried about the high debt-to-GDP ratios in the eurozone, and reacted 
by raising the spreads. No such worries developed in ‘stand-alone’ countries despite the fact 
that debt-to-GDP ratios were equally high and increasing in these countries. This result can 
also be said to validate the fragility hypothesis, i.e. the markets appear to be less tolerant 
towards large public debt accumulations in the eurozone than towards equally large public 
debt accumulations in the ‘stand-alone’ countries.  
Thus, the story of the eurozone is also a story of self-fulfilling debt crises, which in turn lead 
to  multiple  equilibria.  Countries  that  are  hit  by  a  liquidity  crisis  are  obliged  to  apply 
stringent  austerity  measures  which  force  them  into  a  recession,  thereby  reducing  the 
effectiveness of these austerity programmes. There is a risk that the combination of high 
interest rates and deep recessions turns the liquidity crisis into a solvency crisis.  
In a world where spreads are tightly linked to the underlying fundamentals such as the debt-
to-GDP ratio and fiscal space, the only option the policy-makers have to reduce the spreads 
is to improve the fundamentals. This implies measures aimed at reducing the debt burden. 
If,  however,  there  can  be  a  disconnection  between  the  spreads  and  the  fundamentals,  a 
policy geared exclusively towards affecting the fundamentals (i.e. reducing the debt burden) 
will not be sufficient. In that case policy-makers should also try to stop countries from being 
driven into a bad equilibrium. This can be achieved by more active liquidity policies by the 
ECB that aim at preventing a liquidity crisis from leading to a self-fulfilling solvency crisis 
(Wyplosz, 2011 and De Grauwe, 2011).  
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Appendix A. A model of good and bad equilibria 
 
In this section we present a very simple model illustrating how multiple equilibria can arise. 
The starting point is that there is a cost and a benefit of defaulting on the debt, and that 
investors take this calculus of the sovereign into account. We will assume that the country 
involved is subject to a shock, which takes the form of a decline in government revenues. The 
latter may be caused by a recession, or a loss of competitiveness. We’ll call this a solvency 
shock. The higher this shock the greater is the loss of solvency. We concentrate first on the 
benefit side. This is represented in Figure A1. On the horizontal axis we show the solvency 
shock. On the vertical axis we represent the benefit of defaulting. There are many ways and 
degrees  of  defaulting.  To  simplify  we  assume  this  takes  the  form  of  a  haircut  of  a  fixed 
percentage.  The  benefit  of  defaulting  in  this  way  is  that  the  government  can  reduce  the 
interest burden on the outstanding debt. As a result, after the default it will have to apply 
less austerity, i.e. it will have to reduce spending and/or increase taxes by less than without 
the default. Since austerity is politically costly, the government profits from the default.  
A major insight of the model is that the benefit of a default depends on whether this default 
is  expected  or not.  We  show  two  curves  representing the  benefit  of  a  default. BU  is  the 
benefit of a default that investors do not expect to happen, while BE is the benefit of a default 
that  investors  expect  to  happen.  Let  us  first  concentrate  on  the BU  curve.  It  is  upward 
sloping because when the solvency shock increases, the benefit of a default for the sovereign 
goes up. The reason is that when the solvency shock is large, i.e. the decline in tax income is 
large,  the  cost  of  austerity  is  substantial.  Default  then  becomes  more  attractive  for  the 
sovereign.  We  have  drawn  this  curve  to  be  non-linear,  but  this  is  not  essential  for  the 
argument. We distinguish three factors that affect the position and the steepness of the BU 
curve:  
  The initial debt level. The higher is this level, the higher is the benefit of a default. Thus 
with a higher initial debt level the BU curve will rotate upwards. 
  The  efficiency  of  the  tax  system.  In  a  country  with  an  inefficient  tax  system,  the 
government  cannot  easily  increase  taxation.  Thus  in  such  a  country  the  option  of 
defaulting becomes more attractive. The BU curve rotates upwards. 
  The size of the external debt. When external debt takes a large proportion of total debt 
there will be less domestic political resistance against default, making the latter more 
attractive (the BU curve rotates upwards).  
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Figure A1. The benefits of default after a solvency shock 
 
            B       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We now concentrate on the BE curve. This shows the benefit of a default when investors 
anticipate such a default. It is located above the BU curve for the following reason. When 
investors expect a default, they will sell government bonds. As a result, the interest rate on 
government  bonds  increases.  This  raises  the  government  budget  deficit  requiring  a  more 
intense  austerity  program  of  spending  cuts  and  tax  hikes.  Thus,  default  becomes  more 
attractive. For every solvency shock, the benefits of default will now be higher than they 
were when the default was not anticipated.  
We now introduce the cost side of the default. The cost of a default arises from the fact that, 
when defaulting, the government suffers a loss of reputation. This loss of reputation will 
make it difficult for the government to borrow in the future. We will make the simplifying 
assumption that this is a fixed cost. We now obtain Figure A2, which presents the fixed cost 
(C) with the benefit curves.  
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Figure A2. Cost and benefits of default after a solvency shock 
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We now have the tools to analyze the equilibrium of the model. We will distinguish between 
three types of solvency shocks, a small one, an intermediate one, and a large one. Take a 
small solvency shock: this is a shock S < S1 (This could be the shocks that Germany and the 
Netherlands experienced during the debt crisis). For this small shock the cost of a default is 
always larger than the benefits (both of an expected and an unexpected default). Thus the 
government  will  not  want  to  default.  When  expectations  are  rational  investors  will  not 
expect a default. As a result, a no-default equilibrium can be sustained.  
Let us now analyze a large solvency shock. This is one for which S > S2. (This could be the 
shock experienced by Greece.) For all these large shocks we observe that the cost of a default 
is always smaller than the benefits (both of an expected and an unexpected default). Thus the 
government  will  want  to  default.  In  a  rational  expectations  framework,  investors  will 
anticipate this. As a result, a default is inevitable.  
We now turn to the intermediate case: S1 < S < S2. (This could be the shocks that Ireland, 
Portugal and Spain experienced). For these intermediate shocks I obtain an indeterminacy, 
i.e. two equilibria are possible. Which one will prevail only depends on what is expected. To 
see this, suppose the solvency shock is S’ (see Figure A3). In this case there are two potential 
equilibria, D and N. Take point D. In this case investors expect a default (D is located on the 
BE line). This has the effect of making the benefit of a default larger than the cost C. Thus, the 
government will default. D is an equilibrium that is consistent with expectations.  
But point N is an equally good candidate to be an equilibrium point. In N, investors do not 
expect a default (N is on the BU line). As a result, the benefit of a default is lower than the 
cost. Thus the government will not default. It follows that N is also an equilibrium point that 
is consistent with expectations.  
BU 
BE 
   C     
S1   S2 SELF-FULFILLING CRISES IN THE EUROZONE | 27 
 
Figure A3. Good and bad equilibria 
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Thus we obtain two possible equilibria, a bad one (D) that leads to default, a good one (N) 
that does not lead to default. Both are equally possible. The selection of one of these two 
points only depends on what investors expect. If the latter expect a default, there will be one; 
if they do not expect a default there will be none. This remarkable result is due to the self-
fulfilling nature of expectations. 
Since there is a lot of uncertainty about the likelihood of default, and since investors have 
very little scientific foundation to calculate probabilities of default (there has been none in 
Western Europe in the last 60 years), expectations are likely to be driven mainly by market 
sentiments of optimism and pessimism. Small changes in these market sentiments can lead 
to large movements from one type of equilibrium to another.  
The possibility of multiple equilibria is unlikely to occur when the country is a stand-alone 
country, i.e. when it can issue sovereign debt in its own currency. This makes it possible for 
the  country  to  always  avoid  outright  default  because  the  central  bank  can  be  forced  to 
provide all the liquidity that is necessary to avoid such an outcome. This has the effect that 
there is only one benefit curve. In this case the government can still decide to default (if the 
solvency shock is large enough). But the country cannot be forced to do so by the whim of 
market expectations. 
BU 
 BE 
   C     
S1   S2 
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Appendix B. Additional tests: Unit root and cointegration 
Unit root test (H0 hypothesis: Panels contain unit roots) 
Variable  LLC test: p-
value 
Breitung test: p-
value 
IPS test: p-value 
Eurozone:       
Spread  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000 
Debt-to-GDP ratio  0.9985  1.0000  1.0000 
Fiscal space  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000 
Current account to GDP 
ratio 
0.4763  0.2533  0.5324 
Real effective exchange rate  0.2553  0.5947  0.7914 
Growth rate  0.0042  0.0281  0.0277 
Stand-alone:       
Spread  0.0001  0.0961  0.0209 
Debt-to-GDP ratio  0.2222  0.9940  0.9567 
Fiscal space  0.4199  0.9949  0.9878 
Current account to GDP 
ratio 
0.0227  0.0043  0.0981 
Real effective exchange rate  0.0378  0.3613  0.1941 
Growth rate  0.0000  0.0001  0.0000 
Change of exchange rate  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
 
Cointegration Test: Kao Residual Cointegration Test (reject “no cointegration”) 
Econometrics Reference: 
Kao, C. “Spurious Regression and Residual-Based Tests for Cointegration in Panel Data”, 
Journal of Econometrics, 1999, 90, 1-44. 
      =          +    ∆       
 
   
+     
Non-hypothesis   = 1, no cointegration 
  Debt/GDP ratio regression   Fiscal Space regression 
Eurozone countries 
(with time component) 
Reject “no cointegration”      
       (p-value=0.0000) 
Reject “no cointegration” 
      (p-value=0.0000) 
Stand-alone countries 
(without time 
component) 
Reject “no cointegration” 
       (p-value=0.0000) 
Reject “no cointegration” 
       (p-value=0.0000) 
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